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1 Introduction
Climate change is so complicated, and it involves so many sides of so many di⁄erent
disciplines and viewpoints, that no analytically-tractable model or paper can aspire
to illuminate more than one or two facets of the problem. This is a paper in
applied theory, where the application is to climate change. The paper ranges widely
but is primarily about some economic implications of some of the unusually large
structural uncertainties surrounding climate-change extremes.
One major structural uncertainty in climate-change economics concerns the ap-
propriate way to represent damages from global warming. The functional form
used most frequently in the literature is a nested utility speci￿cation, within which
consumption is reduced multiplicatively by a quadratic-polynomial function of tem-
perature change. In this paper I argue that an additive form, in which welfare is the
di⁄erence between the utility of consumption and a quadratic disutility-loss func-
tion of temperature change, may make just as much sense for evaluating extreme
climate damages. The distinction between multiplicative and additive welfare spec-
i￿cations may seem arcane, but I explain why it can make a surprisingly signi￿cant
di⁄erence in the evaluation of future scenarios involving both high temperatures and
high consumption.
There are a great many structural uncertainties about climate change extremes
other than the speci￿cation of damages, which represents just one part of the
economic-welfare side. To represent structural uncertainty on the science side, I
also use one speci￿c example, although several others might have served in this ca-
pacity. So-called ￿climate sensitivity￿is the equilibrium mean surface temperature
response to a doubling of atmospheric CO2. An oft-asked question is: why has it
been so di¢ cult, after some three decades of intensive scienti￿c research, to nar-
row down the upper-tail probability density function (PDF) of climate sensitivity
enough to exclude very high values (say substantially higher than 4.5￿C)? A stan-
dard answer is that seemingly tiny uncertainties concerning the possibility of a large
feedback factor f near one are naturally ampli￿ed into broad uncertainties about
very large values of climate sensitivity ￿ by a highly nonlinear transformation of the
form ￿ = ￿0=(1￿f). A detailed examination of the generic analytical mechanism
behind such an explanation reveals that the implied upper-tail distribution of cli-
mate sensitivity is so ￿fat￿(or ￿heavy￿or ￿thick￿￿all synonyms) with probability
that its variance is in￿nite. In other words, essentially the same argument used by
most scientists to explain why high values of climate sensitivity cannot be excluded
contains within itself the seeds of a generic argument not just for a fat upper tail of
the PDF of climate sensitivity, but for a very fat tail, which is so spread out that it
has in￿nite variance. With an additive quadratic loss function, this in￿nite variance
translates into in￿nite expected disutility.
Climate sensitivity is a long run equilibrium concept that abstracts away from
the transient dynamics by which it is approached as an asymptote. The next two
logical questions concern the transient dynamic phase: (1) what happens to the
PDF of temperatures along the uncertain dynamic trajectory that leads to climate
sensitivity as an asymptotic limit (and whose variance approaches in￿nity, but only
at an in￿nitely distant future time)? (2) what is the welfare evaluation of the
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uncertain transient trajectory of temperatures? The simplest diagnostic energy-
balance model is used to specify quantitatively how the PDF of temperatures varies
over time in approaching its in￿nite-variance limiting PDF. In the case of an additive
damages function (here quadratic in temperature changes), welfare evaluation then
mainly becomes centered on the issue of how future disutilities should be discounted.
I show that when the ￿rate of pure time preference￿or ￿utility discount rate￿is
uncertain, but it has a PDF with in￿nitesimal probability in a neighborhood of
zero, then the limiting expected present discounted disutility of additive quadratic
temperature damages approaches in￿nity. The paper closes by mentioning some
possible welfare and policy implications of this disturbing theoretical ￿nding.
2 Temperature Damages: Multiplicative or Ad-
ditive?
This section of the paper argues that it can make a big di⁄erence for climate-change
policy whether high-temperature damages are speci￿ed as entering the overall net
utility function multiplicatively or additively with consumption. Most modelers
use a multiplicative formulation, perhaps not realizing the degree to which their
model￿ s outcomes depend sensitively on this particular assumption. Here I argue
that an additive form might possibly make as much sense as a multiplicative form
and indicate why this seemingly obscure distinction might matter a lot, especially
at high temperatures conjoined with high consumption.
Although generalizations are possible, suppose for the sake of speci￿city here
that the utility of consumption is isoelastic with coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion
two. Let C be consumption, while T stands for temperature change above the
pre-warming level. A utility function commonly used in the economics of climate
change (for coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion two) is, up to an a¢ ne transformation,
of the multiplicative form
UM(C;T) = ￿
￿￿
1
C
￿
￿
￿
1 + ￿MT
2￿￿
; (1)
where ￿M is a positive coe¢ cient calibrated to some postulated loss for T ￿ 2-3￿C.1
Equation (1) is essentially a single-attribute utility function, or, equivalently, a multi-
attribute utility function with strong substitutability between the two attributes.
This would be an appropriate formulation if the main impact of climate change is,
say, to drive up the price of food and increase the demand for air conditioning.
Instead of the multiplicative functional form (1), suppose we now consider, up to
an a¢ ne transformation, the analogous additive functional form (with a quadratic
loss function)
UA(C;T) = ￿
￿￿
1
C
￿
+
￿
1 + ￿AT
2￿￿
; (2)
1Such type of calibration is done in Nordhaus (2008) and Sterner and Persson (2008), among
others.
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where ￿A is a positive coe¢ cient calibrated to some postulated loss for T ￿ 2-3￿C.
Equation (2) is a genuine multi-attribute utility function. It describes a situation
where the main impact of climate change is on things that are not readily substi-
tutable with material wealth, such as biodiversity and health. The 1 in the right
side of equation (2) is an inessential constant, intended only to facilitate comparison
of (1) with (2). When C is normalized to unity, then UM(1;T) = UA(1;T), and the
same calibration can be used to ￿x the same value of ￿A = ￿B = ￿ in both cases.
Note that (1) and (2) are symmetric, with the only di⁄erence being the ￿￿￿
sign in (1) and the ￿+￿sign in (2). I think it is fair to say that it is hard to argue
strongly for one form over the other from any basic principles, so that, at ￿rst glance
there might seem to be little basis for choosing between the multiplicative form (1)
and the additive form (2). I do not want to take a decisive stand on which of (1)
or (2) are ￿better￿formulations of temperature damages. The main purpose of this
paper is to point out that a seemingly arcane theoretical distinction between additive
and multiplicative disutility damages may have surprisingly strong implications for
economic policy. There is not much di⁄erence between (1) and (2) for small values
of C and T, but when they are large, which is the domain of the utility function
about which we are most unsure, I show that the distinction becomes signi￿cant.
In an e⁄ort to compare and contrast in familiar language the basic properties of
the multiplicative form (1) with the additive form (2), I ask the following question.
What is the willingness to pay as a fraction of consumption that the representative
agent would accept to reduce temperature change to zero? This welfare-equivalent
fraction of consumption w must satisfy the equation
U((1 ￿ w)C;0) = U(C;T): (3)
Plugging (3) into (1) and (2), one obtains, respectively,
wM =
￿T 2
1 + ￿T 2 (4)
and
wA =
￿CT 2
1 + ￿CT 2: (5)
If C is normalized to unity, then for all temperature changes the two speci￿cations
are identical and wM = wA. Notice, though, what happens as C increases from
its initial value of one. Under the multiplicative speci￿cation (4), the fraction of
consumption willing to be paid to eliminate temperature change, wM, is independent
of C. This might appear to be odd because one might think that in a rich world
the fraction of consumption people would be willing to sacri￿ce to eliminate a given
temperature change would be higher than in a poor world. Note that wA in (5) has
just this property.
Let time be denoted t. Thus, consumption at time t is C(t), while temperature
change at time t is T(t). For notational simplicity, normalize so that C(0) = 1,
T(0) = 0. To compare and contrast in familiar language the basic dynamic proper-
ties of the multiplicative form (1) with the additive form (2), I now ask the follow-
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ing question. What is the willingness to pay as a fraction of current consumption
C(0) = 1 that the representative agent would accept to reduce the temperature
T(t) > 0 at time t > 0 down to T(t) = 0? Call this value W. Suppose that the
rate of pure time preference or ￿utility discount rate￿is ￿. Then W must satisfy
the equation
U(1;0) ￿ U((1 ￿ W);0) = exp(￿￿t)[U(C(t);0) ￿ U(C(t);T(t))]: (6)
Suppose consumption grows at rate g, so that C(t) = exp(gt). Then plugging
(1) and (2) into (6), after some algebraic rearranging one obtains
WM =
exp(￿(g + ￿)t)￿T(t)2
1 + exp(￿(g + ￿)t)￿T(t)2 (7)
and
WA =
exp(￿￿t)￿ T(t)2
1 + exp(￿￿t)￿ T(t)2: (8)
The di⁄erence between the multiplicative formulation (7) and the additive for-
mulation (8) is that the latter is free of the powerful dampening term exp(￿gt). To
give a numerical example emphasizing the signi￿cance of this kind of distinction,
suppose that g = 2%, ￿ = 0, t = 150. By the Ramsey formula with coe¢ cient
of relative risk aversion ￿ = 2, the corresponding real interest rate in this example
is r = ￿ + ￿g = 4%. Calibrate ￿ so that 2% of welfare-equivalent consumption
is lost (at C(0) = 1) when T = 2￿C. Then straightforward calculations show that
the willingness to pay at time t = 0 to avoid T(150) =4￿C under the multiplicative
speci￿cation is WM = 0:4%, while under the additive speci￿cation it is WA = 7:5%
￿a di⁄erence of almost twenty times. Another way to see this dramatic di⁄erence is
ask how much of a welfare-equivalent temperature reduction in 150 years would 7.5%
of current consumption buy. With additive utility (8), the answer (from above) is
4￿C. With multiplicative utility (7), the answer is 18￿C!
In this spirit it might be argued that, relative to the multiplicative form (1),
the additive formulation (2) does not trivialize the welfare impacts of large future
temperature changes. One lesson to be drawn from this simple numerical example
is that a seemingly arcane distinction between an additive and a multiplicative
interaction of temperature change with consumption might have big consequences.
If so, then it becomes another example of structural uncertainty exerting a decisive
in￿ uence on climate-change policy (here the structural uncertainty concerns the
functional form of utility damages).
In an important article, Sterner and Persson (2008) tested on a leading integrated
assessment model (IAM) a utility function of the CES form
U(C;E) =
1
1 ￿ ￿
h
(1 ￿ b)C
￿￿1
￿ + bE
￿￿1
￿
i (1￿￿)￿
￿￿1
; (9)
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where the ￿environmental￿good is
E =
E0
1 + aT 2: (10)
With elasticity of substitution ￿ = 1
2 and coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion
￿ = 2, the above formulation (9), (10) is equal (up to an a¢ ne transformation) to
US(C;T) = ￿
￿
1
C
+ 1 + ￿T
2
￿
; (11)
where ￿ = ab=[(1 ￿ b)E0].
Comparing (11) with (2), US(C;T) is identical with UA(C;T). Thus, for the
parameter values ￿ = 1
2 and ￿ = 2 chosen by Sterner and Persson, the additive
version (2) and the CES version (11) are the same and will therefore give the same
results when plugged into any IAM. Consequently, one is free to view this utility
function either through the lens of an additive form or through the lens of a CES
form, using whichever lens gives more insight for a particular application.
Importantly, Sterner and Persson found empirically that plugging their CES
utility function (11) into William Nordhaus￿ s pathbreaking DICE model2 yields a
far more stringent emissions policy than Nordhaus found with his multiplicative
utility form (1). As an empirical matter, therefore, the seemingly obscure distinc-
tion between multiplicative and additive interactions of consumption with temper-
ature change makes a signi￿cant di⁄erence for optimal climate change policy. This
demonstrates how seemingly minor changes in the speci￿cation of high-temperature
damages (here from multiplicative to additive) can dramatically change the climate-
change policies recommended by an IAM. I think the underlying reason is more or
less transparent from the previous discussion of the comparison of (7) with (8).
Fragility of policy to forms of disutility functions is a disturbing empirical ￿nding
because the outcomes of IAMs are then held hostage to basic structural uncertainty
about the way in which high temperatures and high consumption interact. Further-
more, this big di⁄erence comes from a deterministic IAM (DICE with no numerical
simulations of probability distributions) having a relatively high rate of pure time
preference ￿ = 1:5% per year. What I show theoretically in the rest of this paper is
that if one introduces fat-tailed climate change uncertainty, along with even in￿ni-
tesimal probabilities of low rates of pure time preference, the di⁄erence in optimal
policies between additive and multiplicative utilities can become overwhelmingly
dominant.
3 Deep Structural Uncertainty about Climate Ex-
tremes
In this section I try to make a brief intuitive case for the plausibility of there being big
structural uncertainties in the science of extreme climate change. I would interpret
2See Nordhaus (2008).
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this as heuristic evidence that an IAM might be missing something important if its
results do not much depend on the treatment of these big structural uncertainties.
Ice core drilling in Antarctica began in the late 1970s and is still ongoing. The
record of carbon dioxide (CO2) and methane (CH4) trapped in tiny ice-core bub-
bles currently spans 800,000 years.3 The numbers in this unparalleled 800,000-year
record of GHG levels are among the very best data that exist in the science of paleo-
climate. Almost all other data (including past temperatures) are inferred indirectly
from proxy variables, whereas these ice-core GHG data are directly observed.
The pre-industrial-revolution level of atmospheric CO2 (about two centuries ago)
was 280 parts per million (ppm). The ice-core data show that CO2 varied gradually
during the previous 800,000 years within a relatively narrow range roughly between
180 and 280 ppm. Currently, CO2 is at 385 ppm, and climbing steeply. Methane
was never higher than 750 parts per billion (ppb) in 800,000 years, but now this
extremely potent GHG, which is 22 times more powerful than CO2 (per century),
is at 1,780 ppb. The sum total of all carbon-dioxide-equivalent (CO2-e) GHGs
is currently at 435 ppm. An even more startling contrast with the 800,000-year
record is the rate of change of GHGs: increases in CO2 were below (and typically
well below) 25 ppm within any past sub-period of 1,000 years, while now CO2 has
risen by 25 ppm in just the last 10 years. Thus, anthropogenic activity has elevated
atmospheric CO2 and CH4 to levels far outside their natural range at an extremely
rapid rate. The unprecedented scale and speed of GHG increases brings us into
uncharted territory and makes predictions of future climate change very uncertain.
Looking ahead a century or two, the levels of atmospheric GHGs that may ultimately
be attained (unless decisive measures are undertaken) have likely not existed for tens
of millions of years and the speed of this change might be unique even on a time
scale of hundreds of millions of years.
Another disturbing issue concerns the ultimate temperature response to such
kind of unprecedented increases in GHGs. ￿Climate sensitivity￿is a key macro-
indicator of the eventual temperature response to GHG changes. It is de￿ned as
the average global surface warming in equilibrium following a sustained doubling
of carbon dioxide concentrations. Other things being equal, higher values of cli-
mate sensitivity raise temperatures in every period by shifting up their dynamic
trajectory, but it also takes longer for temperatures to reach any given fraction of
their asymptotic limit. Left unanswered by my simplistic treatment here are many
questions, including whether enough can be learned su¢ ciently rapidly about high
climate sensitivity ￿relative to tremendous systemic inertias and lags ￿to be able
to undertake realistic midcourse corrections (more on this later).
A total of twenty-two peer-reviewed studies of climate sensitivity published re-
cently in reputable scienti￿c journals and encompassing a variety of methodologies,
along with 22 imputed probability density functions (PDFs) of climate sensitivity,
are cited by IPCC-AR4 (2007). How to aggregate climate sensitivity PDFs from
various studies is currently a serious unresolved issue. The aggregated PDF should
have a thinner tail than the individual studies to the extent that the PDFs from the
3See L￿thi et al (2008), from which my numbers are taken (supplemented by data from the
Keeling curve for more recent times, available online at:
ftp://ftp.cmdl.noaa.gov/ccg/co2/trends/co2_mm_mlo.txt).
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di⁄erent studies are conceptualized as independent draws from the same ￿correct￿
model speci￿cation. Against this, the aggregate PDF tail should be fattened to the
extent that individual models overlap and are correlated in their mutual omission
of important geophysical processes (like ice sheets) or carbon cycle processes (like
methane releases). The upper-tail distribution of climate sensitivity remains poorly
constrained even after 30 years of research. For what it is worth, the median upper
￿ve percent probability level over all 22 climate-sensitivity PDFs cited in IPCC-AR4
(2007) is 6.4￿C, which is the number that I use here.
Only so-called ￿fast feedback￿processes are included in the concept of climate
sensitivity, narrowly de￿ned. Additionally there are ￿slow feedback￿components
that are currently omitted from most general circulation models (mainly on the
grounds that they are too uncertain to be included).4 A prime omitted component
concerns the potentially powerful self-ampli￿cation potential of greenhouse warm-
ing due to heat-induced releases of sequestered carbon. One vivid example is the
huge volume of GHGs currently trapped in tundra permafrost and other boggy soils
(mostly as methane, a particularly potent GHG). A more remote (but even more
vivid) possibility, which in principle should also be included, is heat-induced re-
leases of the even-vaster o⁄shore deposits of CH4 trapped in the form of hydrates
(aka clathrates) ￿which has a decidedly non-zero probability over the long run of
having destabilized methane seep into the atmosphere if water temperatures over
the continental shelves warm just slightly. The amount of CH4 involved is huge,
although it is not precisely known. Most estimates place the carbon-equivalent
content of methane hydrate deposits at about the same order of magnitude as all
fossil fuels combined. Over the long run, a CH4 outgassing-ampli￿er process could
potentially precipitate a disastrous strong-positive-feedback warming. Thus, the
possibility of a climate meltdown is not just the outcome of a mathematical the-
ory, but has a real physical basis. Other examples of an actual physical basis for
catastrophic outcomes could be cited, but this one will do here.
The above methane-release scenarios are examples of slow carbon cycle feedback
e⁄ects that I think should be included in the interpretation of a climate-sensitivity-
like concept that is relevant for the economics of uncertain extremes. The main point
here is that the PDF of fast plus slow feedback processes has a tail much heavier with
probability than the PDF of slow feedback processes alone. Extraordinarily crude
calculations5 suggest that, when slow and fast feedback processes are combined, the
probability of eventually exceeding 10￿C from anthropogenic doubling of CO2 is very
roughly 5%, which presumably corresponds to a scenario where CH4 and CO2 are
outgassed on a large scale from degraded permafrost soils, wetlands, and clathrates.
To summarize the major implication for this paper, the economics of climate
change consists of a very long chain of tenuous inferences fraught with big uncer-
tainties in every link, of which anthropogenic climate sensitivity (incorporating fast
and slow feedbacks) is but one component. The uncertainties begin with unknown
base-case GHG emissions; then they are compounded by big uncertainties about how
available policies and policy levers will transfer into actual GHG emissions; com-
4The distinction between ￿fast feedbacks￿and ￿slow feedbacks￿is explained in Hansen et al
(2008).
5These calculations are explained in Weitzman (2009a).
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pounded further by big uncertainties about how GHG ￿ ow emissions accumulate via
the carbon cycle into GHG stock concentrations; compounded by big uncertainties
about how and when GHG stock concentrations translate into global mean tempera-
ture changes; compounded by big uncertainties about how global mean temperature
changes decompose into regional climate changes; compounded by big generic un-
certainties about the appropriate structure of damage functions and how to discount
their disutilities; compounded by big uncertainties about how adaptations to, and
mitigations of, climate-change damages are translated into welfare changes at a
regional level; compounded by big uncertainties about how future regional utility
changes are aggregated ￿and then how they are discounted ￿to convert every-
thing into expected-present-value global welfare changes. The result of this lengthy
cascading of big uncertainties is a reduced form of truly extraordinary uncertainty
about the aggregate welfare impacts of catastrophic climate change, which mathe-
matically is represented by a PDF that is spread out and heavy with probability in
its tails. The fat tail of the PDF of overall welfare is the reduced form that con-
cerns economic analysis, not the PDF of climate sensitivity per se, which is but one
limited illustrative example representing the overall science component of structural
uncertainty. In other words, uncertain climate sensitivity serves in this paper as a
particular example of uncertain climate science as a whole, which itself is a subset
of overall uncertainty.
4 Why is Climate Sensitivity So Unpredictable?
Taking climate sensitivity as a metaphor for climate science, it appears to bother
scientists a lot that, even after some three decades of intensive research, essentially
no progress has been made on excluding very high values of climate sensitivity (sub-
stantially higher than 4.5￿C, say). A longstanding informal explanation for this
state of a⁄airs ￿which focuses on the mechanism by which small individual forcing
feedbacks are ampli￿ed into a large climate-sensitivity multiplier ￿was formalized
recently in a culminating Science article by Roe and Baker (henceforth R&B) en-
titled ￿Why is climate sensitivity so unpredictable?,￿from which the title of this
section was taken.6 A troubling economic implication of R&B, which I explain
later in more detail, is that the asymptotic tail probability of large climate sensitiv-
ity appears to be declining toward zero so slowly, relative to its impacts, that this
fat-tail aspect seems like it should play a signi￿cant role in welfare analysis. Here
I reformulate at a high level of abstraction the analytical essence of a R&B-style
explanation to emphasize that it implicitly contains a theoretical argument pointing
toward very fat tails of climate sensitivity. In other words, I am making the simple
point that the same (or at least a very similar) argument used by climate scientists
to explain why high values of climate sensitivity cannot be excluded contains within
itself the seeds of a more general argument not just for fat tails, but for very fat
tails, which spread the PDF so far apart that its variance is e⁄ectively in￿nite. By
6See Roe and Baker (2007). There is a long list of predecessors, ranging from Wigley and
Schlesinger (1985) (or maybe even earlier), to Allen et al (2006).
www.economics-ejournal.orgEconomics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal 9
focusing on the feedback-multiplier nub of this argument, I naturally pass over a
great many important details of the underlying science.
In estimating climate sensitivity (denoted ￿), feedbacks are everything. The ulti-
mate temperature response of a climate system to imposed GHG shocks is unknown
mostly because the exogenous initial forcing is ampli￿ed by uncertain endogenous
feedback factors like albedo, water vapor, clouds, and so forth. These feedback
factors have complex, nonlinear, and even chaotic features. Overarching this messi-
ness, R&B argue, feedbacks still combine additively and linear systems analysis is
still a useful way of seeing the forest for the trees. Climate sensitivity in this R&B-
style view is a derived concept able to be portrayed abstractly as an ampli￿er (or
multiplier) for a forcing impulse to a linear feedback process. More basic in this
process than the multiplier-ampli￿er ￿ is the aggregate feedback factor or coe¢ cient
f. Not only does f act on the original CO2 forcing, but it also acts on the results of
its own forcing action, and so forth, ultimately causing an in￿nite series of feedback
loops as described by the di⁄erential equation in the next section.
The aggregate feedback coe¢ cient f has a critical additivity property in its
components:
f =
n X
j=1
e fj; (12)
where each of the n primitive e fj represents a feedback sub-factor, such as the albedo,
water vapor, or clouds previously alluded to. In the R&B-style worldview, the
total feedback-forcing factor f is considered more fundamental than the climate-
sensitivity multiplier ￿ because f scales additively in its primitive sub-components
e fj (whereas ￿ does not scale additively in ￿j = ￿0=(1 ￿ e fj)) and because each e fj
is (at least in principle) directly measurable, in the laboratory or in the ￿eld. By
contrast, ￿ is observable only indirectly, as the equilibrium limit of an iterative
multiplier process which requires (at least in principle) the passage of an in￿nite
number of multiplier rounds over real time by the formula
￿ = ￿0
1 X
i=1
(f)
i =
￿0
1 ￿ f
: (13)
If each primitive e fj is an independently distributed random variable (RV) and
n is large, then from (12) and the central limit theorem a case could be made that
the RV f might be approximately normally distributed. A normal PDF for f
is the prototype case considered in the R&B-style modeling tradition. To draw
out the generic implications of a R&B-style explanation for the derived fatness of
the upper tail of ￿ requires showing formally how the argument generalizes from
the normal to essentially any reasonable PDF of f. The base-case normal PDF
in the R&B-style tradition is presumably truncated from above at f = 1, or else it
could be argued that the implied unstable dynamics would have produced a runaway
feedback ampli￿cation at some time in the past. However, it is far from clear how
exactly this truncation at f = 1 (of the normal or any other PDF) is to be carried
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out in practice, or even how it is to be conceptualized ￿and the formal R&B-style
argument for ￿ = ￿0=(1 ￿ f) having a PDF with a fat upper tail is left somewhat
dangling on this point.
Let the PDF of the RV f be ￿(f) with upper support at f = 1. The spirit
of a R&B-style explanation is that high values of f ￿ 1￿ having ￿small but non-
negligible￿probability get nonlinearly skewed upwards into a fat-upper-tail PDF of
￿ = ￿0=(1 ￿ f). Without further ado I assume that a fair translation of the idea
that high values of f ￿ 1￿ have ￿small but non-negligible￿probability is that the
PDF ￿(f) has the properties
￿(1) = 0; ￿
0(1) < 0: (14)
It is important here to understand that I am not assuming a positive point
probability of occurrence for a feedback value f = 1, in which case the results to
follow would be trivial. I am not even assuming that the probability density at
f = 1 is positive. I am only assuming in (14) that in the limit the probability
density of f changes linearly (from an initial value of zero) within an arbitrarily
small neighborhood of f ￿ 1￿.
With the usual Jacobian change-of-variable transformation ￿(f)df !  (￿)d￿ =
￿(f(￿))f0(￿)d￿, applied to ￿ = ￿0=(1 ￿ f), the derived PDF of ￿ is
 (￿) = ￿0 ￿
￿
1 ￿
￿0
￿
￿
1
￿
2 (15)
for all ￿ > 0. The mean of ￿ is given by the expression
E[￿] ￿ lim
M!1
M Z
0
￿ (￿)d￿ < 1; (16)
while its variance is
V [￿] ￿ lim
M!1
M Z
0
(￿ ￿ E[￿])
2  (￿)d￿ = 1; (17)
where the integral in (17) is blowing up essentially because, from (15), the integrand
inside of (17) is proportional to 1=￿ as ￿ ! 1, making the integral (17) approach
￿￿
0(1)lnM as M ! 1.
The signi￿cance of (17) for economic policy is not subtle. As climate sensitivity
goes, so goes the eventual mean planetary temperature response to increased GHGs.
While global warming is just one example of a fat-tailed f ! ￿ feedback-multiplier
process, it is special because of the enormous potential damages to worldwide welfare
associated with very large values of ￿. If additive economic damages increase at
least as fast as quadratically in temperatures, as in (2), then (17) indicates that the
probability-weighted expected value of climate damages is in￿nite.
A standard criticism of my (or any) oversimpli￿ed reliance on the time-independent
long run equilibrium concept of climate sensitivity is that the catastrophically high
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temperature values will materialize (if they materialize at all) only in the remote
future. If one brought back the time element by focusing more on the transient dy-
namics and less on the stationary limit, this line of argument goes, short to medium
term concerns would dominate ￿ and the climate sensitivity issue might recede.
Some have even interpreted the R&B-style explanation of fat-tailed climate sensi-
tivity as signifying that the concept itself has run into diminishing returns, and the
scienti￿c community should essentially ￿call o⁄ the quest￿of trying to make more
precise estimates of ￿ in favor of concentrating greater e⁄ort on analyzing short-
to medium-term temperature dynamics and implications. In the rest of this paper
I will show that when one formalizes the uncertain trajectory of temperature dy-
namics, along with analyzing carefully the issue of discounting utility (or disutility)
under uncertain rates of pure time preference, then the long run behavior of the
system can in principle continue to play a signi￿cant role in economic analysis and
policy discussion.
5 A Dynamic Aggregative Model of Global Warm-
ing
This section compresses into a single di⁄erential equation what is arguably the
simplest meaningful deterministic-dynamic model of the physical process of global
warming.7 Of course this particular one-di⁄erential-equation model cannot possibly
capture the full complexity of climate change. However, I think that the highly
aggregated approach taken here is realistic enough to serve as a springboard for
meaningful discussions of some basic climate-change issues, which, for the purposes
of this paper, may actually be clari￿ed when tightly framed in such stark simplicity.
Factors that a⁄ect climate change are standardly segregated into ￿forcings￿and
￿feedbacks.￿ A climate forcing is a direct, primary, or exogenous energy imbalance
imposed on the climate system, either naturally or by human activities. Exam-
ples include changes in solar irradiation (the prototype, in whose units all other
forcings may be expressed), volcanic emissions, deliberate land modi￿cation, or an-
thropogenic changes in atmospheric stocks of greenhouse gases, aerosols, and their
precursors. (The radiative forcing from CO2 happens to be proportional to the
logarithm of its atmospheric concentration, but this is not true in general for all
GHGs.) A climate feedback is an indirect, secondary, or endogenous radiative
imbalance that ampli￿es or dampens the climate response to an initial forcing. An
example is the increase in atmospheric water vapor that is induced by an initial
warming due to rising CO2 concentrations, which then acts to amplify the warming
through the greenhouse properties of water vapor, further accelerating the process.
Suppose, for simplicity, that in pre-industrial-revolution times (t ￿ 0) the plan-
etary climate system had been in a state of (relative) equilibrium at a constant
7This super-simple diagnostic energy-balance model is sprinkled throughout the scienti￿c lit-
erature and appears formally in, e.g., Andrews and Allen (2007), or Roe (2007), both of which
contain further references to it, including who created it and more realistic extensions of it. My
only possible originality here is in expositing this basic one-di⁄erential-equation model to a broader
audience, primarily economists.
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temperature with constant radiative forcing and no radiative imbalance. Let F(t)
stand for radiative forcing at time t. Normalize F(t) = T(t) = 0 for t ￿ 0. Imagine,
in a thought experiment, that a sustained radiative imbalance of constant magnitude
R￿ has been additionally imposed. (Whether this constant additional radiative im-
balance R￿ is itself exogenous or endogenous is not relevant in this context because
only the reduced-form total imbalance matters for its expository role here.) Let T(t)
be the temperature response at time t > 0. If the earth were a blackbody planet,
with no atmosphere and no further feedbacks, the long-run ￿reference￿non-feedback
temperature response as t ! 1 would be T(t) ! ￿0R￿, where ￿0 is the feedback-
free constant de￿ned by the fundamental physics of a blackbody reference system
as described by the Stefan-Boltzman law. Even in richer more-realistic situations
with atmospheric feedbacks and complicated dynamics, other things being equal it
is not a terrible approximation that at any time the temperature moves with an in-
stantaneous velocity roughly proportional to the reference imbalance. This means
that the linearized di⁄erential equation of temperature motion is
_ T(t) =
1
k
[R￿(t) ￿
T(t)
￿0
]; (18)
where the positive coe¢ cient k in (18) represents the aggregate thermal inertia or
e⁄ective capacity of the system as a whole to absorb heat. In this application, k
essentially stands for the overall planetary ability of the oceans to take up heat.
The full temperature dynamics of an idealized non-blackbody planetary system
can now most simply be described as follows. Count time in the conventional
modeling format where the present corresponds to t = 0. At any time t > 0,
suppose that the system is subjected to an exogenously imposed additional radiative
forcing of F(t) (relative to its pre-industrial-revolution equilibrium rest state of
zero). In the application here, the exogenously imposed additional radiative forcing
is essentially the logarithm of the relative increase of atmospheric CO2 over pre-
industrial-revolution levels. Without loss of generality, it is convenient throughout
this paper to normalize the unit of forcing to correspond to a doubling of CO2. If
G(t) is the concentration of atmospheric carbon-dioxide-equivalent (CO2-e) GHGs
at time t (in parts per million (ppm)), and G (￿280ppm) is the pre-industrial-
revolution CO2-e concentration of atmospheric GHGs, then
F(t) =
1
ln2
ln
￿
G(t)
G
￿
: (19)
The trajectory of exogenous (or primary) radiative forcings fF(s)g for 0 < s < t
(here essentially standing for past anthropogenic increases in atmospheric GHG
stocks) causes temperatures to rise over time, which induces feedback-like changes
in secondary radiative imbalances (such as cloud formation, water vapor, ice albedo,
lapse rates, and so forth). Lumped together, these ￿secondary￿radiative imbalances
are typically more powerful in ultimate magnitude than their ￿primary￿inducers.
Let the endogenously induced overall radiative imbalance at time t be denoted RI(t).
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Let the total change in radiative imbalances at time t be denoted R￿(t). Then
R￿(t) = F(t) + RI(t): (20)
In the problem at hand, the temperature change T(t) induces a (comparatively-
fast-acting, relative to (18)) endogenous radiative imbalance RI(t) according to the
formula
RI(t) =
f
￿0
T(t); (21)
where the (linear) feedback factor f is a basic parameter of the system. Not only
does f act on the original CO2 forcing, but it also acts on the results of its own
forcing action, and so forth, ultimately causing an in￿nite series of feedback loops.
As mentioned, the relevant feedback factors in climate change involve cloud for-
mation, water vapor, albedo, and many other e⁄ects. A key property of linear
feedback factors is that (as with radiative forcings or radiative imbalances) the var-
ious components and subcomponents can be aggregated simply by adding them all
up because they combine additively.
Plugging (21) and (20) into (18) then yields, after simpli￿cation, the basic dif-
ferential equation
_ T(t) =
1
k
￿
F(t) ￿
1 ￿ f
￿0
T(t)
￿
(22)
with the initial conditions F(0) = T(0) = 0. The closed-form solution of (22) is
T(t) =
1
k
t Z
0
F(s) exp
￿
(s ￿ t)
￿
1 ￿ f
￿0
￿￿
ds: (23)
The oversimpli￿cations of physical reality that have gone into the one-di⁄erential-
equation temperature change trajectory (22) are numerous. As just one example,
the parameters that appear in (22) or (23) are not true constants because they might
co-vary over time in complicated ways that this simplistic formulation is incapable
of expressing. The only defence of this ultra-macro approach is a desperate need for
analytical simplicity in order to see the forest for the trees. It seems fair to say that
(22) captures the dynamic interplay of forces along a global-warming path decently
enough for the purposes at hand ￿and almost surely better than any alternative
formula based on one simple linear di⁄erential equation.
Even accepting the enormous oversimpli￿cations of reality that go into an equa-
tion like (22) or (23), there remain massive uncertainties concerning the appropriate
values of the structural parameters. For simplicity, the critical feedback parameter
f is chosen to be the only uncertainty, but it should be appreciated that the relevant
values of k and of forcings fF(t)g are also very uncertain and co-vary in ways that
are not fully represented here, even leaving aside the model itself being an uncertain
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simpli￿cation of a much more complicated reality. Generally speaking, additional
uncertainty strengthens the message of this paper.
Just glancing at equation (23) is suggestive of why it is so di¢ cult in practice to
infer f directly from data. The record of past forcing histories is extremely noisy
and such components as aerosol concentrations are notoriously di¢ cult to identify.
Furthermore, it is readily shown that the ￿rst-order response of a system like (23)
to a change in forcings does not involve long-run parameters like f at all, but more
centrally concerns the overall ability of the oceans to take up heat as embodied in
the thermal inertia coe¢ cient k. The parameter k itself is not very well known in
this aggregative context and can be interpreted as having time-varying values for
di⁄erent stages of di⁄erent heat-absorbing processes. It is statistically very di¢ cult
to distinguish between a high-f low-k world and a low-f high-k world. To be able
to infer f at all precisely would require a long and fairly accurate time series of past
natural forcings along with a decent knowledge of the relevant thermal inertias ￿
none of which are readily available. From this, from the di¢ cult politics of the
situation, and from the very long pipeline commitment of atmospheric CO2 stocks,
it follows that prospects for a meaningful ￿wait and see￿reactive policy for GHG
￿ ow emissions may be quite limited.
For notational convenience and analytical sharpness, I restrict the situation here
to the most basic case of the dynamic temperature reaction to a step-function forcing
represented by an instantaneous doubling of CO2-e GHGs: F(t) ￿ 1 for t ￿ 0 and
F(t0) ￿ 0 for t0 < 0. Then (23) simpli￿es down to
T(t j f) =
￿0
1 ￿ f
￿
1 ￿ exp
￿
￿
￿
1 ￿ f
k￿0
￿
t
￿￿
: (24)
Note that the right hand side of (24) approaches t=k when going to the limit as
f ! 1. This implies from (24) that T(t j f) < T(t j 1) = t=k for f < 1, implying
that the bounded RV T(t j f) must have ￿nite (but increasing) variance no matter
what is the PDF of f satisfying (14).
Equilibrium climate sensitivity is de￿ned as
￿ ￿ lim
t!1T(t) (25)
and it is apparent from applying (25) to (24) that
￿ =
￿0
1 ￿ f
; (26)
which is one of the most basic relationships of climate change. Conventional as-if-
deterministic point estimates might be ￿0 ￿1.2, f ￿.65, ￿ ￿3, with the standard
deviation of f approximately ￿f ￿.13. Relevant values of k might vary widely in
this aggregate context, depending on the time scale of the heat absorption process.
Other things being equal, higher values of f shift up temperatures T all along the
trajectory (24), but with higher values of f it also takes a longer response time to
reach any given fraction of the asymptotic value ￿ represented by (25), (26).
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The third link in my chain of reasoning concerns the welfare and policy im-
plications of the in￿nite limiting variance of ￿ from the second link. Under any
foreseeable technology, elevated stocks of CO2 are committed to persist for a very
long time in the atmospheric pipeline. Ballpark estimates imply that, for every unit
of CO2 anthropogenically added to the atmosphere, ￿70% remains after 10 years,
￿35% remains after 100 years, ￿20% remains after 1,000 years, ￿10% remains after
10,000 years, and ￿5% remains after 100,000 years.8 It can also take a long time
to learn about looming realizations of uncertain, but irreversible, climate changes.
Thus, the CO2 stock inertia, along with slow learning, makes it unreliable to react
to unfolding disasters by throttling back CO2 ￿ ow emissions in time to avert an
impending catastrophe. Here I just simplistically assume that the planet will never
be able to react to bad future scenarios by stabilizing atmospheric concentrations
below a doubling of CO2-e GHG concentrations relative to pre-industrial-revolution
levels. Such a stark approach may be an acceptable proxy for reality in the context
of the message I am trying to convey, because it seems to me, alas, that CO2-e GHGs
￿560ppm are essentially unavoidable within the next half century or so, and will
plausibly remain well above this level for one or two centuries thereafter, no matter
what new information is received in the meantime. This represents an extreme
and perhaps unrealistic interpretation, but the modeling strategy of this paper is to
lay out the essential structure of my argument as simply as possible, leaving more
realistic re￿nements for later work.
6 How Should Climate-Change Disutilities be Dis-
counted?
The analysis of last section showed that pushing a R&B-style explanation of fat-
tailed climate sensitivity all the way to its logical conclusion implies a PDF having
in￿nite variance. With an additive quadratic disutility of temperature change, this
implies an in￿nite loss of expected welfare, but this in￿nite loss is occurring at an
in￿nitely remote future time. The obvious next question is: what happens to ex-
pected present discounted welfare when the disutility damages of high temperatures
are discounted at the appropriate rate of pure time preference?
Suppose that the damages of temperature changes are quadratic in T and of the
additively separable form UA(C;T) = ￿[1=C + 1 + ￿T 2] from (2), which has the
analytical convenience of allowing one to calculate separately the disutility impact
of temperature changes, irrespective of the time trajectory of consumption. The
super-strong result that follows depends critically upon additively separable utility
and would not hold (in such strength) for the multiplicative form (1): UM(C;T) =
￿(1 + ￿T 2)=C.
8See Archer (2007), pages 122-124, and the further references he cites.
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The temperature change at time t conditional on the realization f is T(t j f)
given by formula (24). The expected disutility damages at time t are then given
(up to an inessential multiplicative constant) by the expression
DE(t) =
1 Z
￿1
[T(t j f)]
2 ￿(f)df; (27)
and it is straightforward to show that DE(t) increases monotonically over time,
approaching a limit of 1, which is consistent with climate sensitivity having an
in￿nite variance in (17). If the rate of pure time preference used for discounting
future utiles or disutilities is ￿ > 0, and if the future is arti￿cially truncated at time
horizon H, then expected present discounted disutility is
D
￿(￿;H) =
H Z
0
DE(t)e
￿￿t dt: (28)
It is essential to realize that the number ￿ being discussed here for discounting
future disutilities is the so-called ￿rate of pure time preference￿or ￿utility discount
rate,￿an elusive concept that is subjective and not directly observable. The ￿utility
discount rate￿ ￿ is not the much-more-familiar number that is used to discount
ordinary goods (r = ￿ + ￿g by the Ramsey formula), and which is identi￿ed with
the everyday concept of an interest rate. It is much harder to argue that this
utility discount rate ￿ should be signi￿cantly above zero than it is to make such an
argument for the ￿goods interest rate￿r, which is far more directly tied to observed
market rates of return on capital that are signi￿cantly positive.9
The next obvious question is: what are appropriate values of ￿ and H to use in
evaluating (28)? For H the answer is relatively easy: by longstanding economic
logic and practice, in principle the horizon ought to be in￿nite and (28) should be
evaluated by taking the limit as H ! 1. The more di¢ cult and more controversial
issue concerns the appropriate rate of pure time preference to be used for discounting
intergenerational disutility damages from future climate change. The question here
is: what is ￿? I think an honest direct answer is: somewhere between zero and
very roughly about 1% per year ￿some people might have opinions, but nobody
really knows. I think it is also fair to point out that a notable minority of some very
distinguished economists believe that the appropriate rate of pure time preference for
discounting intergenerational utilities generally, and disutility damages from future
climate change particularly, should be arbitrarily close to zero. Without taking
sides directly on this issue, I approach the problem indirectly by postulating some
given distribution of subjective probabilities representing overall ￿degrees of belief￿
in the appropriate value of ￿ to be plugged into (28).10
Let the subjective PDF of the RV ￿ be h(￿), with a lower support at ￿ =
0. The formal treatment of the RV ￿ that follows in this section parallels the
formal treatment of the RV f from the last section. In a spirit of giving at least
9Dasgupta (2007) has an insightful discussion of some of the main issues here.
10The logic of this position is spelled out further in Weitzman (2001).
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some limited voice to the opinion that the rate of pure time preference for inter-
generational discounting might be arbitrarily close to zero, I assume that low values
of ￿ ￿ 0+ have ￿small but non-negligible￿probability in the sense that the PDF
h(￿) obeys
h(0) = 0; h
0(0) > 0; (29)
which is the analogue here of condition (14). Essentially, uncertainty concerning the
possibility of a small rate of pure time preference ￿ near zero is naturally ampli￿ed
into uncertainty about very large values of the present discounted value ￿ of a unit
￿ ow by a highly nonlinear transformation of the form ￿ = 1=￿.
It is critical to understand here that I am not assuming a positive point proba-
bility of occurrence for a zero rate of pure time preference, in which case the main
result of this paper would be trivial. I am not even assuming that the probability
density of a zero rate of time preference is positive. I am only assuming in (29) that
the PDF of ￿ increases linearly (from an initial value of zero) within an arbitrarily
small neighborhood of ￿ ￿ 0+.
There are now two RVs: f and ￿. What might be called the ￿expected expected￿
present discounted disutility of temperature change is
D
￿￿(H) =
H Z
0
D
￿(￿;H)h(￿)d￿: (30)
The ￿nal question to be addressed here is: what happens to D￿￿(H) in the
limit as H ! 1? The answer is not obvious. Other things being equal, as
the time horizon recedes the expected disutility damage from more-variable future
temperatures is increasingly dominated by the limiting in￿nite variance of climate
sensitivity. However, other things also being equal, discounting at a positive rate
counteracts this in￿nite-variance asymptote. Yet a third wild card here is that pure
time preference itself is a legitimately-unknown RV in this context, with some ￿small
but non-negligible￿probability of being close to zero, which tends to favor lower
e⁄ective discount rates at longer horizons ￿again other things being equal.11 The
value of the ￿expected expected￿present discounted disutility of temperature change
in (30), which emerges from this pulling of di⁄erent forces in di⁄erent directions, is
the main result of the paper that is exposited in the next section.
7 A Dismal Proposition
The following ￿dismal proposition￿ hints that fat-tailed in￿nite-variance climate
sensitivity may have economic rami￿cations conceivably impacting current policy
analysis.
Theorem 1 In the above model with ￿small but non-negligible￿probabilities,
lim
H!1
D
￿￿(H) = 1: (31)
11This e⁄ect is described in Weitzman (1998).
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Proof. Consider the expression
1 Z
0
[T(t;f)]
2 exp(￿￿t)dt =
￿
￿0
1 ￿ f
￿2 1 Z
0
￿
1 ￿ exp
￿
￿
￿
1 ￿ f
k￿0
￿
t
￿￿2
exp(￿￿t)dt:
(32)
By brute-force integration, the right hand side of (32) is shown to be proportional
to
1=[￿(￿ + (1 ￿ f)=k￿0)(￿ + 2(1 ￿ f)=k￿0)]: (33)
If it were true that
lim
￿!0;f!1
￿
[￿(f)] [h(￿)]
￿(￿ + (1 ￿ f)=k￿0)(￿ + 2(1 ￿ f)=k￿0)
￿
= 1; (34)
then it would follow that
E￿;f
2
4
1 Z
0
[T(t;f)]
2 exp(￿￿t)dt
3
5 = 1; (35)
which in turn would imply (31). But expression (34) must hold because
lim
￿!0;f!1
￿
[￿(1 ￿ f)￿
0(1)] [￿ h0(0)]
￿(￿ + (1 ￿ f)=k￿0)(￿ + 2(1 ￿ f)=k￿0)
￿
= 1; (36)
which concludes this streamlined proof.
Were quadratic disutility to be discounted at a zero rate of time preference, then
it would be straightforward that an in￿nite-variance tail of eventual temperature
change would have a big impact on present discounted expected welfare. What is
perhaps surprising is that this high-impact result can continue to hold even when the
probability density at a zero rate of time preference is zero and is merely increasing
linearly (in the small) with time preference. The in￿nite limit of the theorem
is coming in main part from a perhaps counterintuitive implication of (29) that,
with uncertain rates of pure time preference, utilities in the far-distant future are
discounted at the lowest possible rate of pure time preference, here zero.12 This
holds even when the probability of ￿ ￿ 0+ is in￿nitesimal. In a sense, the model has
been reverse engineered via (29) to put weight on the limiting PDF of temperature
changes, whose variance approaches the in￿nite variance of the PDF of climate
sensitivity. With economic damages quadratic in temperatures, expected present
discounted disutility then approaches in￿nity as the horizon recedes.
Of course any interpretation must be based on an assessment of the model￿ s
overall assumptions. The model of this paper is really more of a suggestive example
than a fully general formulation, and an example that has been reverse engineered
at that. The theorem depends on a conjunction of several basic assumptions, none
12For an exposition of this logic, see Weitzman (1998).
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of which is beyond criticism. Analyzing what happens for H ! 1 stretches the
logic even further. Still, taken as a whole (and even admitting that it has been
somewhat rigged), I think this ￿dismal proposition￿makes it somewhat less easy
to dismiss the signi￿cance of unpredictable climate sensitivity on the grounds that
high values will have impact only in the distant future.
Theorem 1 indicates that the willingness to pay to avoid climate change is un-
bounded. There are several possible ways to escape this disturbing paradox of
in￿nity. The troubling in￿nite limit is technically eliminated by imposing ad hoc
inequality constraints like H ￿200 years, or T ￿7￿C, or f ￿.99, or ￿ ￿.001, or
so forth. However, removing the 1 symbol in this way does not truly eliminate
the underlying problem, because it then comes back to haunt in the form of an
arbitrarily large expected-present-discounted disutility, whose exact value depends
sensitively upon obscure bounds, truncations, severely-dampened or cut-o⁄ prior
PDFs, or whatever other formal mechanisms have been used to banish the 1 sym-
bol. The take-away message here is that reasonable attempts to constrict bad-tail
fatness can leave us with uncomfortably big numbers whose exact value may depend
non-robustly upon arti￿cial constraints or parameters, the signi￿cance of which we
do not honestly comprehend. Theorem 1 should therefore be taken only ￿gura-
tively as holding for some ￿uncomfortably big number￿￿but not for in￿nity. A
reader interested in understanding more about how the in￿nite limit of the ￿dis-
mal proposition￿is to be interpreted and applied in a ￿nite world should consult
the much fuller discussion of this set of issues in Weitzman (2009a) and Weitzman
(2009b). Here I restrict myself just to commenting on the widespread notion that
the extreme realizations being described in the tails are so improbable that they can
e⁄ectively be ignored.
One may not legitimately discard the bad tail of the PDF of a disaster on the
grounds alone that the probabilities are ￿too small to matter.￿ Such de minimis
truncation requires some asymptotic argument along the lines that the limiting
product of the decreasing probability times the increasing disutility is ￿too small to
matter.￿ The most practical way to avoid this vexing tail-evaluation issue is when
there exists strong a priori knowledge that meaningfully restrains the extent of total
damages. If a particular type of idiosyncratic uncertainty a⁄ects only one small part
of an individual￿ s or a society￿ s overall portfolio of welfare, which is the usual case,
exposure is naturally limited to that speci￿c component and bad-tail fatness is not
such a paramount concern. However, some very few but very important real-world
situations have potentially unlimited exposure due to structural uncertainty about
their potentially open-ended catastrophic reach. In these unusual situations, there
is no choice but to evaluate somehow or other the limiting product of probability
times disutility. Climate change potentially a⁄ects the whole worldwide portfolio
of utility by threatening to drive all of planetary welfare to disastrously low levels
in the most extreme scenarios. This tail-evaluation feature, which is essentially
ignored by most conventional IAMs, can understandably dominate the economics of
climate change. Such a feature makes an economic analysis of climate change look
and feel uncomfortably subjective, but, at least in the formulation of this paper, it
is the way things can be with fat tails and unlimited liability.
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Because climate-change catastrophes develop slower than some other potential
catastrophes, there is perhaps more chance for learning and midcourse corrections
with global warming, relative to some other catastrophic scenarios. The possibility
of ￿learning by doing￿ may well be a more distinctive feature of global-warming
disasters than of some other disasters, and in that sense deserves to be part of
an optimal climate-change policy. The other horn of this dilemma, however, is
that the ultimate temperature responses to CO2 stocks have tremendous inertial
pipeline-commitment lags that are very di¢ cult to reverse once they are in place.
This nasty fact can be brutal on illusions about the easy corrective potential of
￿wait and see￿reactive policies. As I already noted, it seems implausible to me
that ultimate stabilized values of GHGs will end up being much less than twice
pre-industrial-revolution values, no matter what realistic future responses to global
warming are undertaken. Reacting to an impending climate disaster by changing
a CO2 emissions-￿ ow instrument (to control the CO2 stock accumulation inducing
the disaster) seems o⁄hand like using an outboard motor to maneuver an ocean
liner away from an impending collision with an iceberg. The role of learning and
midcourse corrections is a subject worthy of further detailed study, the outcome
of which could potentially soften all of my conclusions. However, a conservative
position, at least for the time being, might be to consider that by the time we learn
that a climate-change disaster is impending it may be too late to do much about it.
8 Concluding Comments
Issues of uncertainty and discounting are fundamental to any economic analysis of
climate change. This paper combines together three forms of structural uncertainty:
how to formulate damages, how to discount these damages, and how to express future
temperature dynamics. The paper shows that the single most widespread scienti￿c
explanation of why climate sensitivity is so uncertain at the upper end contains
within itself a generic argument in favor of a very fat upper tail of temperature
changes. When this is merged with an additively separable damages function and
a rate of pure time preference that is unknown but might conceivably be close to
zero, the combination can in principle dominate an economic analysis of climate
change. Such a message is not intended to cause despair for the economics of
climate change, nor to negate the need for further study and numerical simulations to
guide policy. The message is just a cautionary note that this particular application
of cost-bene￿t analysis to climate change seems more inherently prone to being
dependent on subjective judgements about structural uncertainties than most other,
more ordinary, applications.
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